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Abstract—Cascading failure in electric power systems is a 
complicated problem for which a variety of models, software 
tools and analytical tools have been proposed, but are difficult to 
verify. Benchmarking and validation are necessary to understand 
how closely a particular modeling method corresponds to reality, 
what engineering conclusions may be drawn from a particular 
tool, and what improvements need to be made to the tool in order 
to reach valid conclusions. The community needs to develop the 
test cases tailored to cascading that are central to practical 
benchmarking and validation. In this paper, the IEEE PES 
working group on cascading failure reviews and synthesizes how 
benchmarking and validation can be done for cascading failure 
analysis, summarizes and reviews the cascading test cases that 
are available to the international community, and makes 
recommendations for improving the state of the art.  
 
Index Terms—Cascading failure, validation, risk analysis, 
power systems reliability. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ccording to the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (NERC), a cascading blackout is “the 
uncontrolled successive loss of system elements triggered by 
an incident at any location” [1]. Because not all cascading 
outages (a sequence of interdependent component outages) 
result in a blackout (a large, unplanned loss-of-load), this 
paper uses the term cascading failure to represent any 
sequence of independent and dependent outages, regardless of 
whether a blackout ensues. Cascading failures are typically 
triggered by one or more disturbance events, such as a set of 
transmission line or generator outages. Triggering events can 
result from a variety of exogenous threats, such as 
earthquakes, weather-related disasters, hidden failures, 
operator errors, and even deliberate acts of sabotage. Since 
power systems are generally operated to be N-1 secure, most 
historical cascades have been triggered by multiple outages in 
combination, motivating the need for probabilistic analysis. 
The dependent outages in a cascade can result from a wide 
variety of different mechanisms including thermal overloads, 
voltage instability, and angular instability [2]. 
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 Because the resulting blackouts can be large and costly, 
utilities are increasingly required by reliability regulators to 
systematically study and manage cascading outage risk in their 
system. For example, NERC planning standards [3] require 
that, “Each Transmission Planner and Planning Coordinator 
shall investigate the potential for cascading and uncontrolled 
islanding in its planning assessment studies.” Specifically, 
NERC requires utilities to complete simulation studies that 
address each of the following types of cascades: 
• Overloads where a component exceeds the phase 
protective relay settings, assumed to be in accordance with 
PRC-023-2 [4], or a rating established by the operator 
(overload cascading); 
• Multiple generators pull out of synchronism with one 
another (angular instability cascading); 
• Poor transient voltage response due to insufficient dynamic 
reactive resources (voltage instability cascading). 
In addition, new standards are in development in Europe (see 
[5],[6], and [7]) and in the USA (NERC standard TPL-007-1 
[8]) that will require analysis of additional exogenous threats 
such as geomagnetic disturbances. 
 In response to increasing regulations and several large 
cascading blackouts [9]–[11], a growing number of tools are 
being developed in industry and academia to address this 
analysis need. Given that these tools are increasingly being 
used to make large investment decisions, and the critical 
importance of managing the risk of massive cascading 
blackouts, it is important that cascading failure analysis tools 
be tested to ensure that they provide accurate and useful 
information. Doing so requires verification (ensuring that tools 
perform correctly), validation (checking the accuracy of the 
results), and benchmarking (a systematic, reproducible 
validation procedure).  
Practical benchmarking and validation also require the use 
of standard, published sets of test case data that in some way 
represent a particular power system (hereafter “test case”). 
Existing test cases are scattered across multiple continents and 
are often difficult to find or access. Comprehensive 
information about these cases is sorely lacking. In this paper, 
we describe and reference a wide variety of international test 
cases (both public and nonpublic) and provide details on how 
to access them. Also, validation studies often (and should) 
make use of historical data from power system operations. 
Here we describe several sources for this type of data.  
 Thus motivated, the three goals of this paper are: (1) to 
discuss existing approaches to the problem of benchmarking 
and validating cascading outage data and simulators; (2) to 
provide guidance for practitioners and researchers seeking to 
objectively evaluate a particular cascading failure analysis 
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technique or software tool; and (3) review the available test 
cases and other data for cascading failure analysis. This paper 
brings together current research and expert opinions from 
members of the IEEE PES Working Group on Cascading 
Failure, building on prior work in which the group addressed 
methodologies and tools [12]-[13].  
 The paper is organized as follows: Sec. II presents the 
definitions and main requirements for benchmarking and 
validation. Sec. III outlines recommendations for effective 
benchmarking. Sec. IV briefly reviews several published 
benchmark/validation studies. Sec. V critically reviews 
sources of non-test-case data that can be used in cascading 
failure analyses. Sec. VI describes a wide variety of public and 
nonpublic power system test cases, outlines how these cases 
are, or are not, useful for cascading failure analysis, and 
provides guidance for obtaining the cases. Sec. VII discusses 
the need for new test cases. Finally, Sec. VIII summarizes the 
conclusions of the Working Group for cascading failure 
benchmarking and validation.  
II.  BENCHMARKING AND VALIDATION: CONCEPTS AND 
REQUIREMENTS 
This section defines terms and describes important 
attributes of benchmarking and validation studies.  
A.  Definitions 
 Benchmarking is a process for measuring the performance 
of a tool, such as a software program or a business process, 
using a trusted procedure and/or dataset, in a way that allows 
one to compare the performance of one tool to another. Using 
trusted data and procedures when comparing tools allows for 
relatively objective comparisons. For example, the LINPACK 
benchmark [14], which is used to rank supercomputers, is a 
package of data, software libraries, and procedures that, when 
used correctly, allows one to compare the computational 
performance of different computer systems. 
 Because cascading failure analysis (unlike power flow 
analysis, for example) is a relatively immature power systems 
application area, and because there are many uncertainties and 
challenges in modeling and simulating cascading failure, there 
are few complete benchmarks for cascading failure analysis; 
this paper outlines what does exist, and suggests ways to 
improve the state of the art going forward. 
 Benchmarking is closely related to the processes of 
verification and validation [15]. Verification refers to the 
process of checking to see that a tool solves the problem that it 
was intended to solve. In the context of a software tool (as is 
the case with most cascading failure analysis systems), 
verification involves checking to ensure that the tool produces 
the answers that it should get (without numerical instability or 
memory errors, etc.), given its internal assumptions, over a 
wide range of possible operating conditions [16]. Since 
verification is more about avoiding software errors, rather than 
fundamental methodology, this paper focuses more on 
validation, which is the process of checking a system to ensure 
that it obtains answers that are correct, according to a set of 
criteria for correctness [16]. Verification involves checking 
the correctness of the tool (often in the relatively narrow sense 
of being free of bugs), whereas validation typically involves 
the combination of the tool with some type of test data to 
evaluate the correctness of the answers provided by a method. 
Benchmarking typically brings the two processes together to 
create a reproducible process for validating and comparing 
different approaches to the same problem.  
 Within a power systems context validation is necessary both 
for software tools, which integrate concepts about cascading, 
mathematical representations of those concepts, and ultimately 
a software encoding of the mathematics, and for the datasets to 
which cascading failure analysis is applied. The latter is 
particularly important for industry practitioners who need to 
ensure that a particular dataset is an accurate (or at least 
useful) representation of a particular network.  
 There are many useful approaches to benchmarking and 
validation. The following are a few examples: 
1. Checking for internal validity. Internal validation involves 
checking the assumptions that go into a tool to determine if 
they are realistic. Simulation studies involve some 
simplification and approximation of physical processes, so 
internal validation involves determining which assumptions 
are likely to produce misleading results, and which ones are 
appropriate given the purpose of the tool. 
2. Comparing simulation results with real data. The ability to 
reproduce reality with sufficient exactness is the usual 
ultimate goal in validation. However, in the case of 
cascading outages, which encounter many thresholds for 
discrete actions such as tripping a line or not tripping a line, 
similar tools with similar data (or even the real power 
system on successive days) may behave differently under 
very similar conditions. One tool may trip the line and 
another very similar tool may not and this can have a large 
effect on the way that a particular cascade evolves. 
Therefore it is usually too stringent to require an exact 
match of the simulation to real blackout data. There are two 
approaches to solve this. One approach is based on 
engineering judgment and asks whether the simulated 
cascade is one of the plausible sequences of events given an 
engineer’s experience with real events. The second 
approach gathers the statistics of real and simulated 
cascades and asks whether they have similar statistical 
characteristics. For example, the distributions of final 
blackout sizes or how much the cascades propagate can be 
compared. The quantities compared should correspond to 
the conclusions that will be drawn from using the tool. 
3. Comparing the performance of one tool with another tool 
(cross-validation). Once good performance metrics 
(benchmarking processes) have been established, measuring 
the similarities and differences between tools can provide 
valuable insight into the relative merits of the tools. Often 
this process will show that different tools are useful for 
solving different types of problems. 
4. Checking for reproducibility. Given the same method, 
assumptions and data, it is important that a tool be able to 
lead one to similar conclusions from one run to the next. 
Because many cascading failure simulation tools include 
some random variables, the results will sometimes be 
somewhat different among trials; in these cases it is 
important to know how many runs are needed to produce 
statistically reliable results. It is also important to check that 
minor changes in data and assumptions do not produce 
 3 
dramatically different results.  
5. Sensitivity analysis. When a model has many input 
parameters, it is important to know how results change with 
changes in the inputs. A sensitivity analysis tests the impact 
of perturbations to inputs to identify those parameters that 
have substantial impact on outcomes.  
Sec. II.D discusses the application of these approaches to 
power systems in additional detail.  
 A key component of benchmarking and validation is a set of 
trusted test cases/datasets with known properties to which 
each tool can be applied. Because there has been little 
discussion in the literature about the merits of various test 
cases for cascading failure analysis, Sec. V of this paper 
focuses on public data about power system outages, since 
these are particularly valuable in benchmarking and 
validation. Secs. V-VI focus on the use and origins of power 
system test cases.  
B.  The challenges of cascading failure simulation 
Most approaches to cascading failure analysis involve the use 
of a cascading outage simulation tool. Developing and, 
ultimately, validating these tools is a substantial challenge 
because of the numerous, diverse set of mechanisms by which 
all real cascades propagate. For each additional mechanism of 
cascading included in a model one needs to make assumptions 
about how a system will react to extreme, rarely observed 
operating conditions.  
 Potential mechanisms that might be modeled include an 
array of traditional instability and protection phenomena 
including cascading overloads interrupted by relays, hidden 
relay failures, voltage collapse, dynamic instability, and inter-
area oscillations. These have been discussed substantially in 
the research literature and reviewed by IEEE and CIGRE 
working groups [17], [18]. In addition, cascading failures 
typically involve an array of communication, control, 
economic and societal factors. All of these mechanisms occur 
at diverse time scales, further complicating the modeling 
process. Human operators play a particularly important, and 
difficult-to-model role. Operators’ inadequate situational 
awareness was an important factor in a number of recent 
disturbances (e.g., Europe in 2006 [10] and North America in 
2003 [9] and 2011 [11]). On the other hand, operator actions 
can also reduce risk in a system; appropriate mitigating actions 
by operators can arrest the spread of large blackouts. 
Modeling operator actions is a substantial challenge. 
 Other key complicating factors are the uncertainties of the 
system state, and the stochastic nature of both the triggering 
(exogenous) events that lead to the start of a cascade (day, 
time, weather, etc.), and the interdependent (endogenous) 
events involving control, dynamics, and protection through 
which a cascade propagates. Deterministic models can be 
useful when one wants to reproduce a historical event, or to 
study a well understood operating condition such as a state 
estimator case, whereas probabilistic models become 
increasingly important as uncertainty further increases, such as 
in a planning context. 
 While there has been progress in modeling some of these 
mechanisms (both triggering and propagating, deterministic 
and stochastic), the relative importance of the various 
mechanisms is largely unknown. The amount of modeling 
detail required to accurately represent each of the mechanisms 
in a way that leads to useful engineering conclusions remains 
an open question. However, what is clear is that validation and 
benchmarking are critically important in order to improve 
existing models and to identify areas where more research and 
development are needed. 
C.  Importance and Users of Validation and Benchmarking 
 The many complicated mechanisms involved in cascading 
precipitate an even greater need for ensuring that analysis 
methods are valid. Benchmarking and validation are necessary 
to determine which aspects of real blackouts are reproduced 
by different types of models, what sort of conclusions can 
reasonably be drawn from a particular tool, and what 
limitations exist for a particular methodology. There will 
always be a gap between simulation and reality; benchmarking 
and validation are needed to understand this gap, to interpret 
the results, and to determine the extent to which the results can 
inform engineering decisions. Understanding this gap is also 
necessary in order to improve the next generation of modeling 
and simulation tools. 
 Validation and benchmarking are important for a variety of 
stakeholders in the electricity industry. Validation is important 
for researchers testing new ideas to understand the 
implications of, for example, new modeling approaches. For 
software developers and vendors, validation allows potential 
clients to understand the limitations of, and gain confidence in 
a particular tool. And utilities and system operators need to 
validate both case data and tools to ensure that investment and 
operating decisions are based on sound data and models. 
D.  Approaches to Validating Cascading Failure Simulations 
 Several different approaches can be employed to effectively 
validate power system simulations. Within more established, 
restricted and well understood problems, such as power flow 
and standard contingency analysis, there is a measure of 
consensus in the power systems engineering community 
regarding the amount of detail needed to answer particular, 
well-defined questions. For problems of this sort, it makes 
sense to validate simulations by evaluating the accuracy of the 
component models and measuring the extent to which models 
align with measurements. However, this type of consensus 
does not yet exist for cascading failure simulation and 
analysis. As a result, validation approaches that are entirely 
patterned on the traditional approaches for more established 
problems are not generally practical; there is a need for new 
approaches or at least significant extensions to existing ones. 
 One of the key reasons for this lack of consensus is the 
diversity of ill-understood and difficult-to-model mechanisms 
involved in cascading failure, as explained in Sec. II.B. In the 
following we describe several different approaches that can be 
usefully employed to validate a particular cascading failure 
analysis method. 
    1)  Internal Validation and Sensitivity Analysis 
 In all cases, engineering judgment is needed to determine if 
a cascading failure analysis tool is internally valid or invalid, 
in that the modeling assumptions are inappropriate to the 
questions that the model is trying to answer. For example, if a 
tool focuses on studying how cascading overloads propagate 
through a transmission system, power-flow models (and not 
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abstract topological ones; see [19]) are needed in order to 
provide valid answers.  
 An important tool for internal validation is sensitivity 
analysis [20]. If a tool is intended to produce a particular 
statistical outcome (e.g., Loss of Load Probability or Expected 
Energy Unserved), sensitivity analysis can be used to 
determine if a particular modeling assumption has an 
important impact on the outcome variable of interest. 
Assumptions that do not significantly impact the outcome do 
not merit as much attention as those that impact the outcome 
statistic, and thus could lead to erroneous conclusions. 
    2)  Validation: Comparing models to real data 
 In the case of cascading failure, validation against real data 
is particularly important, because complete internal validation 
is infeasible. Modeling all mechanisms of cascading failure in 
great detail is not computationally feasible. But what types of 
comparisons are appropriate and feasible for validating 
cascading failure analyses?  
 One approach is to compare simulated event sequences to 
historical cascade sequences. Many simulations are 
specifically designed for the purpose of reproducing a 
particular historical cascade (e.g., [21]). Doing so can help in 
understanding the cascading mechanisms that contributed to a 
particular blackout and developing the lessons learned. 
Moreover, inaccuracies in particular system model can be 
revealed. In this case, the validation process is clear: the 
simulation is validated for that particular blackout when it 
closely reproduces the sequence of events of that blackout. 
The stochastic nature of initial and operating conditions that 
must be considered when modeling potential future blackouts, 
or when studying blackout risk in general, does not apply for 
this type of event reproduction, since the initial operating 
conditions are known. Reproduction studies of this sort 
typically require tuning of component thresholds and settings 
to reproduce the exact sequence that occurred.  
 However, the ability of a simulation to reproduce a 
particular historical cascade does not necessarily imply that it 
is valid for cascading failure analysis in general, across all 
operating conditions. Uncertainty in the many thresholds 
involved in cascading (e.g., the current at which a line will sag 
into vegetation), operating conditions, and operator actions 
mean that validation of a simulator against one event is 
insufficient to argue that a model is valid for all conditions. 
Because of these uncertainties, two different tools, both 
appropriately validated, can produce different event sequences 
for the same triggering disturbance. Even in a real power 
system, similar initiating events can lead to different outcomes 
on different days. In addition, power network data (line 
impedances, generator set points, etc.), which are core to all 
simulation tools, always include some inaccuracy. An exact 
deterministic match between a cascading simulator and data 
from particular observed cascades is not a necessary condition 
for validation. While the tuning of simulations to observed 
cascades is useful, it is not clear that this tuning will 
consistently improve a simulator’s ability to facilitate good 
decisions about other cascades. An additional challenge to this 
type of validation is that the complete data from historical 
cascades are rarely, if ever, made broadly available, which 
means that very few tools can be extensively compared with 
historical event sequences. 
 On the other hand, comparing the statistical properties of 
simulated cascades to the statistical properties of historical 
cascades is feasible, and provides valuable insight. Indeed 
there are distinctive patterns in the observed statistics of 
historical cascading blackouts, which can be reproduced in 
simulators [21]-[25]. Thus one approach to validation is to run 
a simulator with a suitable sampling of initial states and 
initiating events, gathering the resulting statistics, and then 
comparing the simulation’s statistics with the historical 
statistics [26]. A good statistical match does not necessarily 
prove that the simulation is valid, but it is a positive indication 
that the simulation captures important features of cascading. 
 In particular, one use for blackout size data is to develop 
empirical probability distributions of blackout sizes [21], [23], 
[27], against which simulated data can be compared. An 
important feature of these distributions is the heavy tail, which 
indicates that larger blackouts are more likely than predicted 
by conventional risk analysis methods. The heavy tails result 
largely from cascading failures, in which small disturbances 
propagate additional outages, which progressively weaken the 
system and ultimately produce large blackouts. 
 Conclusions that are more definite can emerge when there is 
a gap between simulated and observed statistics. If the gap is 
too large, then the simulation is not validated. For example, a 
tool cannot be considered valid for long cascades if it cannot 
at least qualitatively reproduce the heavy tails that are 
consistently found in the distribution of historical blackout 
sizes. Another useful statistical measure is the observed 
frequency of cascades of various sizes. On the other hand 
some simulators are not designed to fully simulate long 
cascades, but are designed instead to stop after cascade sizes 
cross a particular threshold (at which point the sequence of 
events can become highly uncertain; see, e.g. [28], [29]). In 
these cases, comparing the frequency of cascades larger than 
10 (for example) dependent events to historical data may also 
be a useful approach. Knowing the nature of the statistical gap 
between a simulator and historical data can drive 
improvements to the model, such as choosing which 
mechanisms to model in greater detail. Standard statistical 
tests can be applied to quantify the gap between real and 
simulated probability distributions. One avenue of further 
research would employ formal computer model calibration 
techniques such as in [30] and references therein. 
    3)  Cross-validation: Comparing models to each other 
 Another useful approach to validation is to compare the 
statistical properties of one model with those of another. 
Observed differences between models can be useful in 
understanding the relative importance of different modeling 
assumptions. One approach, proposed in [31] and [32], is to 
compare the extent to which cascading event sequences in two 
different models include the same endogenous events, when 
subjected to the same sets of initiating events. Doing so allows 
one to test the importance of particular modeling assumptions. 
If a parameter variation substantially changes the agreement 
between a new model being tested and a reference model, that 
parameter is important and should be studied in detail. 
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III.  CHARACTERISTICS OF A HIGH-QUALITY CASCADING 
FAILURE VALIDATION/BENCHMARK ANALYSIS 
 In response to increasing attention to the cascading failure 
problem, there are an increasing number of tools available 
from both research and industry organizations; however, it is 
difficult to know how these tools have been validated. 
Publicly releasing the results of cascading failure validation 
studies can be tremendously valuable to both practitioners and 
researchers. This section offers the working group consensus 
recommendations for publishing the validation and/or 
benchmarking studies. Our objectives are to provide a 
checklist of items that should ideally be included in such 
publications and to speed the dissemination of ideas and 
accelerate acceptance and validation. This working group is in 
turn committed to providing venues for presenting and 
publishing these ideas through its committee meetings, 
website [33], and panel sessions. 
 The core elements of a cascading failure validation study are 
typically: (1) one or more power system case datasets, (2) 
cascade failures models embedded into simulation software, 
and (3) data against which the simulation results are to be 
compared. Validation is important for all three of these stages: 
case data, models, and comparison data. 
 With respect to test case data, studies should use either or 
(preferably) both of public power-flow cases and real 
industry-provided cases. The use of public test cases makes it 
possible for other researchers to reproduce and verify the 
results of particular studies. Real-world test cases allow one to 
evaluate the suitability of a tool for practical industry 
application. In all cases, studies should clearly document data 
sources. If data access is restricted, then the process for 
obtaining the data should be outlined in the study. In situations 
where new or supplemental data are added to publicly 
available test cases, the best practice is to publish the data on 
the Internet, noting any restrictions that are necessary for a 
particular dataset. Often, it is necessary to add new types of 
data to existing test cases in order to test a particular tool. For 
example, component outage probabilities and switching 
configurations can be key elements of cascading, but the 
relevant data are not typically included with standard test 
cases. In such cases, carefully documenting the methods used 
to augment the test case is necessary. 
 In addition, the working group recommends that studies 
include the following elements: 
• Studies should clearly state the objectives of the analysis, 
and the types of conclusions that can be drawn from the 
results. For example, the study should state whether the 
objective is to give a set of credible cascades under stated 
conditions or whether it is to estimate the probability or 
risk of certain cascades.  
• Studies should include some tests on larger power systems 
(e.g., hundreds to thousands of buses), or at least a 
description of how the methods can be scaled up to larger 
systems. Cascading is a large-scale phenomenon; the size 
of a test network can have important impacts on the 
outcomes [34]. 
• Studies should clearly describe the rationale for selecting 
the particular test cases or data used for the study. The 
report should clearly explain the advantages of the 
particular data used, and the shortcomings of data that were 
not used. In some cases, limitations in data availability 
may constrain the available choices.  
• The benchmark should include, or at least reference, 
detailed descriptions of the modeling procedures used to 
come to the report’s conclusions. The benchmark should 
state which initiating and cascading failure mechanisms are 
modeled and indicate how each is modeled. Ideally the 
detail should be sufficient so that an informed researcher 
can statistically duplicate the results (keeping in mind the 
fact that cascading failure is necessarily a stochastic 
phenomenon, making it unlikely that every detail will be 
precisely replicable). Including appendices with example 
event sequences resulting from particular initiating 
disturbances is one way to do this. In other cases, the 
results to be reproduced might be measures of risk, such as 
a probability distribution function for blackout sizes [26], 
for well-documented cases such as the IEEE RTS [35]. 
• If the benchmark makes any claims about probability or 
risk, it must sample from the sources of uncertainty and 
estimate a probability distribution of the blackout size for 
comparison with real data and other simulations. Blackout 
size measures include line outages, load shed, and energy 
unserved. Publishing the statistics of other quantities (for 
example, propagation or cascade spreading) is encouraged. 
Note that even “deterministic” simulations can sample the 
operating conditions and initial outages to estimate a 
probability distribution of blackout size. When sampling is 
used (which should be the case in the vast majority of 
studies), the benchmark should carefully explain the 
sampling methods. The report should specify how the 
method samples from the potential operating conditions, 
initial faults, and the progress of the cascades. 
• A clear distinction should be maintained between models 
attempting to reproduce in detail characteristics of specific 
historic cascade events, and those that aim to assess overall 
risk from cascading events on a planning timescale. 
• Particularly for probabilistic tools, it is important that a 
tool be able to identify internally consistent pre-
contingency conditions, such as would result from a 
security constrained optimal power flow or similar 
dispatch routine [36]. 
• Finally, as previously mentioned, benchmarks should 
clearly list their data sources, including test case data, 
outage data (e.g., TADS [37]). If non-public data were 
used, the authors should include as much detail as possible 
about where the data came from and what procedures (e.g., 
Critical Energy Infrastructure Information [38]) are needed 
to obtain similar data. 
One of the most important characteristics of a 
benchmarking/validation study is to provide quantitative 
metrics that allow future analysts to compare the statistics of 
different studies, and qualitative descriptions that facilitate 
similar comparisons. Conventional reliability statistics, such 
as Loss of Load Probability, are not particularly good 
measures of cascading failure risk because of the many 
uncertainties involved and the fact that cascade sizes can span 
several orders of magnitude. However, useful comparisons can 
be made. Detailed qualitative descriptions that compare 
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simulated cascades to real or other simulated ones can allow 
one to evaluate the credibility of cascade sequences, in terms 
of including familiar or reasonable outage interactions, 
appearance of previously known grid weaknesses, and the 
overall degree of degradation in the grid due to cascading 
relative to the initiating contingencies. Descriptions of the 
patterns in which cascades spread given the cascading 
mechanisms modeled can be useful. Useful quantitative 
features for validation studies include probability distributions 
of cascade size, average amount of propagation, lengths of 
cascades, and statistics of cascade spread. Refs. [21], [27], 
[28] provide useful examples of measurable comparison 
statistics. Further research on formal statistical approaches for 
comparing model outputs with historic data would be of value. 
IV.  EXAMPLE BENCHMARKING STUDIES 
 The Working Group has identified several papers that 
contain notable elements of a good self-published 
benchmark/validation study. The following subsections briefly 
review several of these analyses. 
A.  Reproduction of Existing Cascading Blackout Event 
The cascading blackout on August 10, 1996 blackout 
resulted in a loss of 30,390 MW of load and affected 7.5 
million customers in western North America. Ref. [21] 
describes efforts to reproduce the events of this massive 
cascading failure using a transient stability simulation tool 
(GE PSLF) [39]. This study is notable for several reasons. 
First, it clearly documents the process of comparing a 
simulation model to data from a historical cascade. Second, 
the study illustrates the challenges of reproducing a historical 
cascade with a particular model. As documented in the paper, 
the authors needed to make substantial adjustments to the 
component models before they were able to accurately 
reproduce data from the disturbance. The paper illustrates the 
type of insight gained from reproduction studies. 
B.  Validation via Comparison to Time-domain Simulations 
 Refs. [40], [41] discuss the validation of the cascading 
simulator of a probabilistic tool for operational risk 
assessment called PRACTICE [42], [43] using a time domain 
power system model of the Italian EHV transmission system 
from the early 2000’s. In this case, cascading event sequences 
identified by the simulator were compared to corresponding 
sequences of branch outages obtained from a detailed dynamic 
model. This comparison was completed for a large set of 
single and multiple contingencies and for two different initial 
operating conditions (peak daytime, and nighttime) [40]. The 
two sets of simulated outages matched well, especially during 
the early stages of cascading, where slower overloading events 
were the primary mechanism of failure. The fact that the 
simulated outages did not match well for events during later 
stages of the cascade highlights the challenges of modeling the 
many mechanisms of cascading that occur after the early 
stages. 
C.  Extension of Traditional Methods 
 The benchmarking study reported in [28] describes a 
method for extending traditional reliability planning methods 
to address NERC requirements for multiple-contingency 
analysis. Notably the proposed method classifies 
contingencies that cause limit violations into those that are not 
likely to initiate cascading failure, and those that “cannot be 
eliminated as potential causes for widespread outages.” The 
paper describes the data sources for the study, as well as 
information about how the data might be obtained, and 
provides enough information about the methodology that an 
informed reader might duplicate the results. Power systems 
conferences provide a good venue for publishing studies of 
this sort. The panel format allows for presentations to 
supplement printed material. For example, the presentation 
associated with [28] provided detailed statistical results and an 
example of a cascading chain that could reasonably be 
excluded from cascading and another that could not.  
D.  Benchmarking with a US Western Interconnect model 
 TRELSS is a software package for cascading failure 
analysis [44]. Refs. [45], [46] describe results from an extreme 
events research team, which developed a ~16,000 bus Western 
Interconnection power flow model for cascading failure 
simulation, generated a significant number of initiating events 
(~33,000) to systematically generate cascading scenarios 
(NERC Category-D events [47]), and simulated/evaluated the 
cascading sequences that followed them using TRELSS. 
Methods were developed for identifying critical event 
sequences based on their occurrence in many simulated 
blackouts and ranking initiating events in order of severity. 
Notable features of the benchmark include the modeling of 
protection control groups and voltage problems. Protection 
control groups approximate the effect of the protection system 
when there is a fault with the simultaneous outage of 
predetermined groups of components. Voltages were modeled 
using a quasi-steady state AC power flow model.  
E.  Benchmarking with Eastern Interconnect Models 
 The Potential Cascading Modes (PCM) cascading failure 
simulation software has been tested during several 
demonstration projects with US utilities. In [48] PCM was 
used to automate the process of sequential AC contingency 
analysis in order to identify initiating events that may lead to 
cascading outages due to thermal overloads and voltage 
violations. The project was a large-scale demonstration project 
using a circa 2007 US Eastern Interconnection model with 
approximately 50,000 buses. The project studied 250 NERC 
Category B (single) contingencies and approximately 31,000 
Category C (multiple) contingencies [47]. While the results 
were consistent with prior manual analysis of some of the 
extreme events, PCM also identified some potentially cascade-
initiating contingencies that were previously unknown to the 
participating utilities. 
 A second project [49], which also used an Eastern 
Interconnect model, focused on identifying and analyzing 
optimal remedial actions needed to prevent cascades or 
mitigate their effects. Two types of computations were 
performed: (1) Determining measures to prevent cascading, 
and (2) Mitigating the consequences of cascading outages 
after they have occurred. The results indicated that all 
identified potential cascading modes may be prevented using 
the existing controls in the network, which was consistent with 
manual analysis previously performed by the utility. 
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F.  Validation of OPA on WECC Data 
 The OPA cascading blackout simulation [21] was validated 
on a 1553 bus WECC network model by determining OPA 
parameters from WECC data and then comparing the blackout 
statistics obtained with OPA to historical WECC data from 
NERC and BPA TADS [26]. The blackout statistics compared 
were the distribution of blackout size and the propagation and 
distribution of line outages. Reasonable agreement was 
verified, and attributed to the modeling of the complex system 
feedback modeled in OPA by which the power grid upgrades 
in response to blackouts. 
V.  SOURCES OF CASCADING OUTAGE DATA 
 As suggested previously, comparing a model’s results to 
historical data from real power systems is a useful validation 
method. However, obtaining good data is often not trivial [50]. 
Here we discuss some of the types of data that are available. 
A. Historical Blackout Size Data 
 The North American Electric Reliability Corporation 
(NERC) had previously made public data for reportable 
blackouts in North America since 1984. These data indicate 
that there are approximately 13 very large blackouts (above 
~300 MW) per year. The measures of blackout size in the 
NERC data include load shed (MW) and number of customers 
affected. Blackout duration information is also available, but 
the data quality is less certain. A lightly processed version of 
these data used in [23] is available on the Internet [24]. 
Blackout size data of this sort have provided key insights in 
the study of cascading large blackouts. The NERC data have 
been analyzed in [21], [23] and used for validation of a 
cascading failure simulation in [26]. International data on the 
distribution of blackout size is reviewed in [27]. 
 The NERC data result primarily from U.S. government 
reporting requirements. The thresholds for reporting a 
blackout include uncontrolled loss of 300 MW or more of firm 
system load for more than 15 minutes from a single incident, 
load shedding of 100 MW or more implemented under 
emergency operational policy, loss of electric service to more 
than 50,000 customers for 1 hour or more, and other criteria 
detailed in the U.S. Department of Energy forms EIA-417 and 
OE-417. As with all real data, the NERC data have some 
limitations, including missing and incorrect data. In addition, 
reporting practices have changed somewhat over time, which 
may impact observed trends in the data. 
A.  Transmission Line Outage Data 
 Transmission owners in the USA are required to report 
higher voltage transmission line and transformer outage data 
to NERC for the Transmission Availability Data System 
(TADS). The TADS data describe the element, time, and 
cause for major component outages that occur within NERC 
regions. More than a decade of this type of transmission 
component outage data is publicly available from BPA [51]. 
In addition, NERC publishes aggregated quantities based on 
the TADS data [52]. The TADS outage cause codes include 
such initiating causes or factors such as weather, lightning, 
foreign interference, equipment failure, power system 
condition, human error, and unknown. 
 One use for this type of data is to group outages from a 
period of time (such as a year) into cascades according to the 
outage times, and then analyze the results to estimate the 
extent to which outages propagate [25]. The average annual 
propagation of line outages is a new metric of cascading and 
can be used to quantify the effect of cascading on the 
distribution of the number of lines outaged [25]. In the BPA 
data, this propagation increases as a cascade continues and 
then appears to level off. Quantifying the way that the 
propagation of line outages behaves in real data provide a way 
to validate cascading failure simulations. For example, the 
observed propagation can be compared to the corresponding 
propagation of line outages in cascades produced by a 
simulation [26]. 
B.  Canadian Data 
 The Canadian Electricity Association (CEA) adopted a 
proposal to create a facility for centralized collection, 
processing and reporting of reliability and outage statistics for 
electrical generation, transmission and distribution equipment 
in 1975. The transmission segment of the Equipment 
Reliability Information System (ERIS) program includes 
transmission equipment outage statistics for equipment with 
operating voltages of 60 kV and above and was implemented 
in 1978. Ref. [53] indicates two main purposes of data 
collected in the ERIS system; the first is to assess past 
performance of typical transmission elements, and the second 
is to estimate its future performance. CEA outage data 
statistics were also used to analyze common-mode and 
dependent outage events in the bulk transmission system [54]. 
C.  WECC Data 
 The Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) 
Transmission Reliability Data (TRD) collection system was 
initiated in 2006 and collects both forced and scheduled 
outages for all circuits (transmission lines and transformers) 
configured ≥ 200 kV. The TRD database contains outage data 
history and inventory data for each WECC participating 
member utility. The collected data are used to support WECC 
Reliability Criteria and Performance Category Upgrade 
Request Process (PCUR) and form the basis for the State of 
the Interconnection reports produced in WECC in 2012 and 
2013 [55]. Detailed analysis of TRD data was performed in 
[56][57]. Ref. [56] presents concepts associated with the 
statistical validation of performance indices obtained from 
outage data and inventory data in the TRD system. Ref. [57] 
presented performance indices of bulk transmission system 
elements (lines and transformers) with emphasis on common-
mode and dependent outage events. 
D.  Reports on Historical Outages  
 Since there are many detailed and useful reports on 
historical outages, we do not summarize them here, but refer 
to [9], [11], [58]-[60]. It is especially useful to read these 
reports to get an impression of the variety and complexity of 
mechanisms involved in cascading. Inspiring examples of 
reproducing the details of particular outages include [21], [61]. 
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VI.  POWER SYSTEM TEST CASES AND CASCADING ANALYSIS 
 Most cascading failure analyses involve the use of power 
system test case data. Validating a particular tool will thus 
usually involve the use of a particular set of test case data, 
which typically represents a particular power system operating 
at one or more states. While criteria for modern test cases have 
been suggested and the desirability of providing access is 
recognized [50], to our knowledge these criteria have not been 
applied to existing test case or used to develop new cases. 
Cases that meet the basic criteria proposed would be 
candidates for inclusion in a cascade failure benchmark 
protocol. In this section we discuss a variety of public and 
non-public test case data sources, suggest how these datasets 
can be accessed, and (where applicable) their potential for use 
in cascading failure analysis.  
A.  Small, Publicly Available Test Cases 
 A number of test cases have been published and released 
publically over the last several decades. These test cases were 
mainly developed as standardized datasets to test and compare 
results from different approaches and methodologies. Some, 
but not all, of these cases are useful for certain types of 
cascading failure analysis. It is important to note that many of 
the test cases were originally developed in order to benchmark 
a specific power system problem, other than cascading failure. 
For example, the IEEE RTS 1996 focuses on system reliability 
analysis, whereas the IEEE 118 and 300 bus test cases were 
designed for testing power flow algorithms.  
 One challenge for the applicability of many of these test 
cases to cascading failure analysis is network size. Because 
cascading is inherently a large-scale power systems problem, 
most types of cascading failure analysis require larger test case 
(e.g., at least 100 buses). Another problem for many public 
test cases is the lack of coordinated line rating limits. 
However, because public test cases facilitate reproducibility, 
these cases continue to be used for research and development.  
 For completeness, this section introduces all of the most 
common public test cases, which are summarized in Table I. 
    1)  The IEEE 1979 and 1996 Reliability Test Systems (RTS) 
 The IEEE 1979 RTS 24-bus test system is a reference 
network that was extensively used to test or compare methods 
for system reliability analysis [35], [63]. The IEEE 1996 RTS 
73-bus test system interconnects three identical RTS 24-bus 
test systems [35]. The IEEE 1979 test case has been used to 
evaluate cascading outage models that include protection 
system elements (such as relay failure or wide area 
monitoring) [77]-[80] as well as to assist Monte Carlo type 
simulations for power system vulnerability assessment [81]-
[86]. More recent papers have explored similar topics with the 
relatively larger IEEE 1996 test case and leveraged its size to 
illustrate islanding and intelligent control in the context of 
cascading outages [87]-[92]. It is often a useful starting point 
for research, given that the case includes line ratings and 
reliability data, however the system is quite robust by default 
and thus often requires some modification before cascading 
failure data can be acquired from the case. 
    2)  The IEEE 14, 30, 57, 118, 162, and 300 Bus Test Cases 
 The IEEE 14, 30, 57, 118, 162 and 300 Bus Test Cases 
[64]-[67] represent different snapshots of a portion of the 
American Electric Power System (in the Midwestern US) as it 
was in the early 1960’s. The 300 bus test case represents a 
system that interconnects three control areas.  
 The smaller cases in this group have been used to explore 
structural vulnerability of power systems, static security 
margins, and the role of DC systems in cascading failures 
[93]-[98]. The larger cases have proven useful in order to 
assist probabilistic approaches to the analysis of cascading 
TABLE I. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR COMMON PUBLIC POWER SYSTEMS TEST CASES 
Test case name /Source 
No. of 
Buses 
No. of 
Lines 
No. of 
Transformers 
No. of 
Gen. 
Units 
Gen. Cap, 
MW 
Load, 
MW 
Line 
Limits? 
Dyn. 
Data? Ref. 
New Brunswick 85   98 24 395   4,320   3,156  Yes  [62] 
IEEE RTS 1979  24   34   5   33   3,405   2,850  Yes No [63] 
IEEE RTS 1996  73   104   16   99   10,215   8,550  Yes Noa [35]  
IEEE 14  14   20   -   5   272   259  No No [64] 
IEEE 30  30   41   -   6   300   283  No No [64] 
IEEE 39  39   34   12   10   7,665   6,150  No Yes [65],[66]  
IEEE 57  57   80   -   7   1,279   1,250  No No [64] 
IEEE 118  118   177   9   54   3,800   3,668  No No [64] 
IEEE 162b  162   238   46   17   17,440   15,381  No Yes [64], [67] 
IEEE 300  298   304   105   69   22,930   22,470  No No [64] 
NETS – NYPS 68  68   66   20   16   17,830   17,620  No Yes [68] 
Poland system c 
Poland§ 
 2,383   2,896   170   327   29,593   24,558  Yes No [69] 
ICPS a 11  11   11   -   1   72   57  Yes No [70], [71] 
ICPS a 13  13   13   -   1   3,016   1,800  Yes No [70], [71] 
ICPS a 43  43   43   -   1   8,012   6,965  Yes No [70], [71] 
Reduced WECC   200  294 67  31   62,200   53,800  Yes Yes [72],[73] 
IEEJ East 10 d   47   78   22   10   81,430   80,000  No Yes [74] 
IEEJ East 30  107   136   55   30   73,540   72,600  No Yes [74] 
IEEJ West 10  47   32   10   10   107,930   107,800  No Yes [74] 
IEEJ West 30  115   99   30   30   100,460   100,200  No Yes [74] 
Nordic 32  32   52   17   23   10,738   10,368  No Yes [75] 
a Ref. [76] proposes a set of dynamic data for this case. 
b There are two variants for this test case, a 162-bus/17-gen system and a 145-bus/50-gen system.  
c There are seven variations of this test system included with MATPOWER (see Sec. VI.B.3)  
d The gen. capacity and load for the IEEJ Cases (Japan) in Table I correspond to daytime conditions. Those test cases also include nighttime conditions. 
*  
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failures, interaction models [99]-[105], and intelligent 
islanding solutions [106] - [107]. While these models have 
been used for cascading failure analysis, the lack of 
transmission line flow limits mean that limits must be 
synthesized for cascading failure analysis, which may limit the 
usefulness of these cases for some types of analysis. There 
have been recent efforts to include typical dynamic data in 
most of these models [108]. 
    3)  The IEEE 39 Bus Test System 
 The IEEE 39 Bus Test Case is an approximate 
representation of the New England 345 kV system [65]-[66]. 
The test system includes dynamic data of the generators with 
exciters and it was originally developed to explore an energy 
function analysis for transient stability. This test case has also 
been endowed with a protection system and used to study 
hidden failure impact on cascading propagation and to 
demonstrate intelligent control techniques for vulnerability 
assessment  [106], [107], [109]-[112]. 
B.  Public Test Cases Based on Industry Data 
Here we describe industry-grade test cases that can be 
useful for cascading failure analysis. 
    1)  New Brunswick (NB) Test System 
 In 1987 CIGRE Study Committee 38 published the Power 
System Reliability Analysis Application Guide, which 
describes various reliability approaches, techniques and data 
requirements [113]. In 1992 the CIGRE Task Force 38-03-10 
conducted research based on findings in [62] and compared 
various software tools for power system reliability analysis 
using the New Brunswick Power test system. The published 
report [62] presents a complete example, including the data 
required, the assumptions made, and the techniques available 
for the analysis. By 1996 the New Brunswick system was used 
to compare nine different reliability models with and without 
these network reinforcements.  
    2)  The NETS-NYPS 68 Bus Test System 
 The NETS-NYPS 68 Bus Test case [68], [114] represents a 
reduced order equivalent of the interconnected New England 
test system (NETS) and New York power system (NYPS). 
There are five geographical regions. Generators G1 to G9 
represent the NETS generation, G10 to G13 represent the 
NYPS generation, and G14 to G16 are dynamic equivalents of 
the three neighbor areas connected to the NYPS.  
    3)  The MATPOWER Polish Test Cases 
 The MATLAB-based toolbox MATPOWER [69] includes 
some of the IEEE reliability test cases described above and 
also provides several larger steady-state cases based on the 
Polish network. Dr. Roman Korab from the Silesian 
University of Technology originally provided these data. The 
Polish test cases represent the 110kV, 220kV and 400kV 
networks for the following snapshots: 
• Poland 2003/2004: Winter peak and off-peak (2746 buses), 
summer peak (2736 buses) and off-peak (2737 buses). 
• Poland 2007/2008: Summer peak (3120 buses), winter 
peak (3375 buses including equivalents for the connections 
with the German, Czech and Slovak networks). 
Because the data are public and because of their relatively 
large size, these cases have been used by a number of authors 
for cascading failure analysis (e.g. [36], [115]-[117]). The case 
was recently extended for dynamic simulation with synthetic 
machine data that was generated according to rules based on 
conversion rules used in the Siemens PSS/E program [32]. 
This is a notable example of a test case that may be effectively 
used for a wide variety of cascading failure validation studies. 
    4)  32 Bus Nordic and CIGRE Test Case 
 The 32-bus Nordic test system [75], [118] had 23 generators 
and was originally developed by CIGRE in 1995 to test long-
term dynamics and it was later modified to study voltage 
stability. A detailed description of the CIGRE 32 Bus Test 
Case can be found in [118]-[120]. There are two different 
voltage levels, 130 kV and 400 kV, and dynamic and static 
data can be found in [121]. 
    5)  ICPS 11-, 13- and 43-Bus Test Systems 
 These three Ill-Conditioned Power Systems (ICPS) of 11, 
13, and 43 buses are used primarily to test methodologies and 
programs for solving ill-conditioned systems or determine the 
existence of load flow solutions [70]–[71]. 
    6)  WECC Reduced 200-bus System 
 This system was used to demonstrate practical use of the 
Generation Restoration Milestones (GRM) methodology [72] 
and to examine the effects of replacing conventional 
generation by wind and solar generation on the grid voltage 
performance [73]. 
    7)  Japanese IEEJ bulk power system models  
 The Institute of Electrical Engineers Japan (IEEJ) has 
developed four Japanese test systems [74], which include 
generator dynamic data. The 50 Hz system models (East 10-
machine East 30-machine systems) represent the looping 
system in the Tokyo area. The 60 Hz system models (West 10-
machine and West 30-machine systems) represent the 
longitudinal grid structure connecting the west area and the 
east area. These Japanese test systems include two different 
load conditions (daytime and night time). Table I summarizes 
the basic information for the daytime conditions. 
C.  Published Test Cases with Restricted Access 
 In addition to published cases that have free access, there 
are some well-known cases with restricted access of one kind 
or another. Frequently these might be cases used by a 
particular vendor. A program license or some other permission 
might be required to access these cases. In other cases these 
could be government cases, special study group cases, or 
utility cases where membership or approval of the group is 
required for access. Due to these limitations, the published 
works on cascading failure analysis that leverage these test 
systems are scarce. The following subsections give 
background information and example applications for the test 
systems summarized in Table II. 
    1)  GE PSLF Test Cases 
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 These cases are supplied as part of GE PSLF program 
installation [39].  
    2)  PowerWorld Test Cases 
 PowerWorld software ships with three test cases (5, 7, and 
10 buses). The 5-bus case was used to test a power flow 
redistribution algorithm designed to mitigate cascading 
blackouts [122]-[123]. 
    3)  NPGC Test Case 
 The NPGC (Northeast Power Grid of China) system 
consists of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, and the northern part 
of Inner Mongolia of China [103], [124]-[125]. The system 
covers an area of more than 1.2×10!km! and serves more 
than 100 million people. Most of the hydropower plants are 
located in the east and most of the thermal power plants are 
located in the west and Heilongjiang province. The major 
consumers are in the middle and south of Liaoning province. 
Hence the power is transmitted from the west and the east to 
the middle and from the north to the south. 
 This system has been studied using two different cascading 
failure simulators: the improved OPA model [124] and the 
OPA model with slow process [125]. The models are 
calibrated to obtain blackout frequency similar to the NPGC 
system. The blackout size distribution of the NPGC system 
obtained from the two models also matches well a statistical 
analysis of historical blackout data in China [126]. The NPGC 
test case has been also used to validate the Galton-Watson 
branching process model for estimating the statistics of 
cascades of line outages and discretized load shed [103]. 
    4)  POM 4900 Bus Test Case [127] 
 The POM 4911 bus test case represents the 12 control areas 
of the Texas Interconnection.  
    5)  TRELSS Test Case [44] 
 The TRELSS 2182, 12-area bus test case is a reduced 1992 
summer case for the eastern USA interconnection. The data 
were included as part of installation of the EPRI TRELSS 
Program. Since this dataset was explicitly developed for 
cascading failure analysis, it is a particularly useful test case 
for cascading analysis. Ref. [128] explores the distribution of 
initial failures for this test case. 
D.  Obtaining Real System Models 
 Ultimately, it is important to test cascading analysis tools on 
validated representations of real power systems. In some 
cases, models of power systems used in transmission operation 
and planning are available. Accessing models in Great Britain, 
the United States, and Australia are discussed in [50]. Here we 
further and briefly describe the development and availability 
of a sample of real system models from around the world.  
    1)  United States 
 Prior to the attack on the World Trade Center on September 
11, 2001, as a part of “open access” in the USA, basic power 
flow data and maps were available on the public internet for 
download. While this practice has ceased, significant amounts 
of data can be obtained through open access, provided proper 
procedures are followed. Specifically, power flow (positive 
sequence) grid models, system maps, and switching diagrams 
are available to anyone who can demonstrate a valid need, is 
willing to sign a nondisclosure agreement, and passes a 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) screening 
process. The ability to access the data is established in the 
Code of Federal Regulations at 18 C.F.R. § 388.113. The 
procedure for obtaining data can be found at [38]. Reliability 
data can be accessed via the references in Sec. V. 
    2)  Brazil 
 The Brazilian power system model used by the system 
operator and utilities consists of approximately 5000 buses, 
7000 branches and 1500 generators. This includes all buses 
from 230 kV to 750 kV and some lower voltage buses. Peak 
load is approximately 80 GW. The generation is mainly hydro 
and typically distant from load centers. Consequently, the 
system depends on long high voltage transmission lines and 
DC links. Cascading effects can be mainly triggered by 
multiple outages of these lines. The integrity of the Brazilian 
electrical network heavily relies on special protection schemes 
[129], which are mainly used for load and generation 
shedding. The power flow and dynamic models are available 
online in the National System Operator website [130].  
 The power flow data are formatted for locally used 
software, but can be easily exported to other applications. On 
the other hand, most of the dynamic models are user-defined. 
Although both the model description (control blocks 
interconnections) and respective parameters are published, 
exporting these models to other power system applications is 
not a trivial task. SPS data is currently unavailable. However, 
the probability of a SPS failure to operate as designed should 
be taken into account in the cascading modeling as it 
potentially has a high impact on the reliability of the Brazilian 
power system. The effect of SPS reliability on the probability 
of cascading outages has been evidenced by recent blackouts 
in Europe, such as the Irish disturbance of August 2005 [131] 
and the Nordic disturbance of December 2005, where a 
spurious operation of SPS and/or a SPS failure to operate 
when required contributed to their development.  
 Reliability indices for the Brazilian power systems from 
2007 to 2011 can also be found in the ONS website [130]. 
These indices include total number of perturbations and the 
total number and amounts of losses of load. 
TABLE II. SUMMARY OF TEST CASES WITH RESTRICTED ACCESS 
Test case name 
/Source 
No. of 
buses 
No. of 
lines 
No. of 
xformers 
No. of 
gen. units 
Gen. cap. 
MW 
Load 
MW 
Line 
limits? 
Dyn. 
Data? 
Ref 
GE PSLF 18 18  18 6 4 3,093 2,949 Yes Yes [39] 
GE PSLF 56 56 56 37 18 3,349 3,255 Yes Yes [39] 
PowerWorld 5  5 2 3 2 506 500 Yes Yes [122] 
PowerWorld 7 7 11 0 5 767 760 Yes Yes [122] 
PowerWorld 10 10 16 0 7 970 880 Yes Yes [122]  
NPGC 568 429 264 129 18,497 18,365 Yes No [103] 
POM 4900 4,911 5,072 922 454 44,531 43,752 Yes Yes [127] 
TRELSS 2,182 3,311 355 268 147,605 143,536 Yes No 
 
[44] 
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    3)  Italy 
 A model of the Italian transmission power system, which 
was used to validate the PRACTICE cascading simulator [43], 
[40]-[42], has been implemented in a time domain simulator 
used by the Italian TSO [132] by exploiting data from 
previous research projects. The model represents the EHV 
(400/220 kV) Italian transmission system of early 2000’s with 
some equivalents for the neighboring countries: it consists of 
about 1400 electrical nodes, 1000 lines, 700 transformers and 
300 generating units. The dynamic models include TSO-
customized models for prime movers, control, protection and 
defense systems and a load model, which captures the typical 
behavior of the sub-transmission networks connected to the 
HV (132/150 kV) side of EHV/HV transformers. Both a peak 
and an off-peak operating scenario are available. 
 The above data are available for research purposes inside 
RSE, which is not authorized by the TSO to let others access 
them. More recent network models are being created starting 
from the available data, by adding recent grid reinforcements. 
Towards this goal, RSE is consulting the grid development 
plans published by the TSO and publicly available at [133] 
they provide reliability indicators of the grid over the years, 
the time schedule of new grid reinforcements and the actual 
state of progress of scheduled improvements. The same 
documents also report the connection of new renewable and 
conventional power plants to the grid. At a European level, a 
significant source of information is the Ten-Year Network 
Development Plan of ENTSO-E [134], which describes the 
major projects to strengthen the European Network in the 
medium and long term. 
    4)  Building a Real System Model in Europe 
 Ref. [135] proposes an approximate power flow model of 
the first synchronous area of the interconnected power system 
of Continental Europe to study the effects of cross-border 
trades. The model is built by combining a simple knowledge 
of power system engineering standards and typical values with 
publicly available information, which includes national 
generation, peak load, power flow exchange, cross-border line 
information, generation/substation lists, and geographic 
information on population and industry from public websites. 
More recently, the Working Group “System Protection and 
Dynamics” (SPD) of ENTSO-E developed a Dynamic Study 
Model (DSM) [136] for the main global dynamic phenomena 
(frequency transients and oscillation modes) among the areas 
of the system. A 2020 peak demand case presented in [136] 
includes 26 areas, 21,382 nodes and 10,829 generators. The 
DSM uses standard dynamic models for loads, generators and 
their control devices. The standard dynamic model parameters 
are tuned using measurement of system events and experts’ 
knowledge. The DSM has some limitations for dynamic 
analyses of cascading, as it does not include component 
protections, defense plans or particular control schemes (like 
over/underexcitation controls, over/underfrequency control), 
or realistic load dynamic modeling. The model has undergone 
simplification and anonymization for data security reasons and 
its use is recommended exclusively under the supervision of a 
SPD group expert, to balance the need to perform research 
activities with the need to defend the system against cascading 
failures potentially triggered by anti-social elements. The 
Initial Dynamic Models from ENTSO-E can be accessed if a 
confidentiality agreement is signed. 
VII.  EMERGING REQUIREMENTS FOR CASCADING ANALYSES 
As cascading failure analysis becomes more common in the 
electricity industry, new requirements for these analyses will 
certainly emerge. Here we briefly mention several areas where 
additional improvements are needed in future benchmarking 
and validation studies. 
A.  Improved test cases 
 No existing test case provides all of the information that one 
would ideally want to perform a complete cascading failure 
benchmark study. There is substantial need for collaborative 
work to generate new test cases or improve upon existing ones 
to support a wide range of cascading failure analysis. In the 
view of the working group, the following data would be 
particularly valuable in such test cases: 
• Generator cost, or other dispatch criteria 
• Facility Ratings (power flow limits) 
• Protection system/relay data 
• Branch outage probability data (see below) 
• Breaker failure and bus section fault probabilities  
• Detailed node-breaker topology data (see below)  
• Power system loading, hazards, and weather  
There is a distinct need for test cases that provide probabilistic 
data and thus allow utilities to explore the potential benefits of 
probabilistic/risk-based approaches to security and cascading 
failure analysis [5]. There is also a need for publically 
available test cases that have been thoroughly evaluated 
specifically for the problem of cascading failure analysis. The 
TRELSS [44] test case is a useful, but not easily accessible, 
example of this. The development and public release of such 
test cases is an important topic for future work. 
B.  Use of cases with node-breaker representation 
 For many years the majority of system planning studies 
have used “bus-branch” models. While these models are 
adequate for most studies they have important limitations. For 
instance, basic bus-branch data do not enable one to determine 
the substation breaker configuration, and will thus limit one’s 
knowledge of the system’s response to contingencies. An 
alternative is to use “node-breaker” representations, which are 
increasingly used for studies of cascading and variable energy 
resource integration. For example, WECC has begun 
transferring “node-breaker” models used for state estimation 
to its TSOs to perform operational studies. This allows one to 
use the same nomenclature in both offline and online system 
models, which enables full automation of the creation and 
processing of contingencies. 
C.  Wide-area protection and smart-grid systems 
As smart-grid technology such as phasor measurement units, 
dynamic line ratings, and real-time demand management 
systems become more common, there will be an increasing 
need to model these systems within cascading failure studies. 
However, wide area protection schemes that make use of these 
systems can be very complicated; incorporating such systems 
into cascading failure models is an important topic for future 
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research and development. Moreover the increasing 
penetration of intermittent generation based on renewable 
energy sources and the higher frequency of extreme weather 
events calls for the probabilistic assessment of the power 
system resilience to these phenomena. In particular, weather 
data and load forecasting can serve as probabilistic inputs to 
both on-line and off-line cascading analyses. 
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS 
 Cascading outages, being a combination of many different 
interactions, is a very complicated problem for which many 
methods of simulation and analysis are emerging. While each 
of these tools may produce plausible results and there is some 
commonality with respect to producing sequences of potential 
cascade scenarios, there is no consistency in results and the 
actionable conclusions are not well determined. The 
mechanisms that need to be modeled and the required details 
of the model that are necessary to produce useful and 
consistent results are not understood. For example, will 
sequences of steady state solutions produce an adequate result 
or are dynamics necessary? The required art in simulation is 
not at all settled, with open questions on the tradeoffs between 
speed and accuracy, sampling appropriately from the 
uncertainties, generating plausible cascades, estimating the 
cascading and blackout severity, and most importantly, what 
decisions can be justified based on the results. For example, 
are statistical projections of blackout frequency and extent 
from simulations adequate to make investment decisions? 
 Benchmarking and validation are essential to guide and 
further the current developments in cascading analysis. In this 
paper, the working group has discussed and surveyed the 
current state of the art and made recommendations to facilitate 
progress and good practice in benchmarking and validation. 
Much of the practical implementation of benchmarking and 
validation hinges on the available data and test cases. We give 
a detailed account of the available data in this paper. We also 
critically and systematically surveyed the international state of 
the art in cascading failure test cases and indicated key 
requirements for further improvements. This will enable and 
encourage the community to access and use these test cases as 
well as guide further improvements so that cascading failure 
models, analyses and simulations can be properly tested, 
benchmarked, and verified. 
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